Job Market Paper:
Vaccines at Work
(with Roberto Mosquera and Adrian Chadi)
Influenza imposes substantial costs in terms of human lives and productivity losses. Vaccination could be a cost-effective way to reduce these costs, but low take-up rates, particularly of working adults, and vaccination unintentionally causing moral hazard may decrease its benefits. We ran a natural field experiment with employees of a large bank in Ecuador where we experimentally manipulated incentives to participate in a flu vaccination campaign. We find that reducing opportunity costs of vaccination doubled take-up. Coworker peer take-up also increased individual take-up significantly. Contrary to the company's expectations, the effect of vaccination on health outcomes was ineffective with no measurable health externalities. Using administrative records on sickness diagnoses and employee surveys, we find evidence consistent with vaccination causing moral hazard, which could decrease its effectiveness.
Private Health Insurance under Universal Health Care
(draft online soon)
The purchase of private health insurance is clearly beneficial in the absence of public insurance. However, it is difficult to evaluate individual costs and benefits when baseline coverage exists for everyone. I study the consequences of being privately insured in a world where universal health care is the baseline. The problem of selection is approached through a regression kink design in conjunction with a policy implemented in Australia in the year 2000 which punishes agents for delaying the purchase of private health to later in life. By investigating the benefits with an administrative tax panel, this study reveals potential hidden costs and unintended consequences of private health insurance under universal health care.
Television, Health and Happiness
(with Adrian Chadi - draft online soon)
Watching television is the most time-consuming human activity besides work but its role for individual well-being is unclear. Negative consequences portrayed in the literature raise the question whether this popular activity constitutes an economic good or bad and is a prime example of irrational behavior reducing individual health and happiness. We are the first to comprehensively address this question by exploiting a large-scale natural experiment in West Germany, where households in a few geographically restricted areas received commercial television via terrestrial frequencies. Rich panel data allow us to determine how signal availability over time changes individual time use and well-being. Contrary to previous research, we find no health impact when television consumption increases. For life satisfaction, we even find positive effects. Additional data supports the notion that television is not an economic bad and that non-experimental evidence may be driven by negative selection.
Work in Progress:
Behavioral Welfare of Health Insurance Coverage
(with Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie)
The Returns to Elective Surgery
(with Luke Chu)